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1Views on a new Near East
The Role of the Mosque in the Syrian Revolution
NearEastQuarterly · Tuesday, March 20th, 2012
By Thomas Pierret
Thomas Pierret is a Lecturer in Contemporary Islam at the University of Edinburgh.
A former post-doctoral fellow at Princeton University, he completed his PhD on the
modern ulama in Syria at Sciences Po Paris and the University of Louvain. He is the
author of “Baas et Islam en Syrie. La dynastie Assad face aux oulémas” (Paris: PUF,
2011).
 
Syrian mosques constituted the backbone of the Syrian insurgency of the early 1980s,
as armed Islamist groups recruited much of their membership in mosque-based study
circles that had flourished among the urban middle-class during the previous decade.
Islamic networks and, therefore, mosques, have been far less central to the current
uprising,  which  relies  on  a  broader,  humbler  and  less  urban  popular  base.
Nevertheless, places of worship and men of religion have played a role that is not
insignificant.
The mosque as a symbol and as a place of gathering has been crucial to ongoing
events. Many of the early demonstrations witnessed in March 2011 took place in and
around mosques after Friday prayer, which under Baathist rule has been one of the
very few opportunities for mass gatherings. In Deraa, the first seat of the uprising,
protesters entrenched themselves in the grand mosque al-Umari for a week until it
was stormed by security forces. The Umayyad mosque in Damascus was also among
the  first  venues  for  demonstration  in  the  capital,  as  thousands  shouted  “God is
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2greatest!” and “Freedom!” after Friday prayer on March 18 and 25. However, the
mosque, located in the heart of the Old City, was rapidly ‘neutralised’ through various
repressive measures including the creation of “mosque committees” – groups of thugs
recruited by the regime to pack prayer rooms and to break up demonstrations on
Fridays.
Despite  repression,  other  Damascene  mosques  like  al-Rifa‘i  (Kafr  Souseh)  and
al-Hasan  (Midan)  remained  major  hotbeds  of  unrest  for  several  months.  Hasan
became such a prominent symbol of and for the opposition that its forecourt was
chosen as the starting point of an anti-regime demonstration organised by – mostly
secular – artists and intellectuals in July 2011. Even in Aleppo, which had remained
calmer  than  Damascus  until  early  2012,  the  Amina  mosque  in  the  middle-class
neighbourhood of Sayf al-Dawla was one of the few places that witnessed several
demonstrations.1
Mosques  were  also  at  the  centre  of  several  episodes  of  state  repression  that
profoundly shocked religious-minded Syrians and,  in the eyes of  many,  made the
security forces appear as an Alawite sectarian militia battling against the creed of the
Sunni  majority.  Not  only  did  the  army,  police  and  shabiha  (pro-regime  thugs)
repeatedly penetrate mosques to beat demonstrators, thus violating the sacredness of
the place, they sometimes committed gratuitous acts of sacrilege. For instance, one
video posted on YouTube purportedly shows a group of Syrian soldiers sitting in a
mosque before mocking the Islamic prayer under the aegis of a smoking “imam”.2
During the summer of 2011, soldiers deliberately targeted mosques in Homs and Deir
ez-Zour, in the east, with 23mm anti-aircraft guns. These attacks provoked such an
outrage that Bashar al-Assad himself felt compelled to deny the accusations during a
Ramadan banquet organised in honour of  the Muslim scholars –  a  blatant  lie  as
demonstrated by several video clips.3
Syria’s religious Sunni leaders have been deeply divided by the current events. In the
Umayyad  mosque  in  Damascus,  early  demonstrations  happened  in  spite  of  the
pro-regime sermons delivered by the preacher Sa‘id Ramadan al-Buti, a scholar of
world standing and an old ally of the Baathist regime. In the al-Rifa‘i and al-Hasan
mosques, worshippers came from all over the capital to listen to outspoken clerics,
respectively Usama al-Rifa‘i and Krayyim Rajih. Whereas the most vocally pro-regime
sheikhs like al-Buti and the Grand Mufti Ahmad Hassun had been close to the Assad
family  for  decades,  al-Rifa‘i  and  Rajih  had  only  recently  established  acceptable
relations with the regime after years of conflict: the former had spent 15 years of his
life in exile, and the latter was the spiritual heir of Hasan Habannaka, the leader of
the religious opposition to the Baath in the 1960s.4 Consequently, they had much less
to lose by standing against the regime than their more compromised colleagues. The
content of their sermons was not overtly revolutionary, but nevertheless stood in total
contradiction with the official discourse: whereas the latter depicted the protest as the
result of a foreign conspiracy, the rebellious scholars proclaimed the legitimacy of
democratic demands and held the regime responsible for the violence.
Although cases like al-Rifa‘i and Rajih were rather exceptional in Damascus, the fact
that both of them were highly respected figures made them a serious threat to the
regime. In August the two rebellious clerics were joined by several of their senior
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3colleagues from Damascus in signing a statement condemning the military crackdown
on the defiant cities of Hama and Deir ez-Zour. The move was all the more worrying
for Assad that a similar statement was released at the same moment by the Muslim
scholars of Aleppo, who until then had remained almost totally silent.
Combined with an upsurge in the number and frequency of demonstrations in and
around the capital, the clerics’ lack of discipline convinced the regime to break with
the hesitant approach it had adopted until then: outspoken preachers were dismissed
from their Friday pulpit, and al-Rifa‘i was even assaulted by regime thugs during the
Night of Power.5
This  showdown revealed  both  the  determination  of  the  regime  and  the  clergy’s
weaknesses.  Indeed,  the former’s  fears  of  popular  outrage,  which until  then had
prevented it  from cracking down on senior  Muslim scholars,  did not  materialise:
although the assault on al-Rifa‘i  provoked large demonstrations in the suburbs of
Damascus, very little happened in the sheikh’s actual stronghold, that is, the middle
and  upper-class  neighbourhoods  of  the  city  centre.  Moreover,  when  his  mosque
reopened a few weeks later with al-Rifa‘i’s son Bilal as preacher, the attendees at the
Friday sermon had dramatically decreased.
This fall in mass support was deeply resented by close disciples of the sheikh, who
blamed the “cowardliness” of the Damascene bourgeoisie.6 Another way to look at this
episode would be to say that it illustrates the class dimension of the Syrian uprising.
Whereas the insurgency of the early 1980s was a predominantly urban middle-class
movement,  the  2011  revolution  found  the  overwhelming  majority  of  its  active
partisans in poorer towns and neighbourhoods. This does not mean that the upper
classes  look  favourably  at  the  regime,  but  that  after  a  decade  of  economic
liberalisation, they have been reluctant to jeopardise their comfortable lifestyle in
favour of a perilous revolutionary process.
There  is  sometimes  more  than  the  fear  of  chaos  behind  the  quiescence  of  the
privileged classes, however. Over the last decades, it has been very hard to do serious
business in Syria without buying off  one or more influential  intelligence officers.
Corruption has thus created close relations between the economic elites and the
security apparatus. Since the Muslim scholars have always been closely tied to the
merchants, the former were inevitably dragged into this unholy alliance. This trend
was reinforced by the fact that crony businessmen, who contrary to the old merchant
families had not traditionally funded religious activities, started to do so during the
last decade in order to buttress their electoral ambitions. It is striking, for instance,
that when Sheikh al-Rifa‘i’s mosque was surrounded by regime thugs on the Night of
Power, Muhammad Hamshu, the front man and brother-in-law of Bashar al-Assad’s
brother Maher, apparently intervened, in vain, to negotiate the withdrawal of the
assailants.7
Apart from al-Rifa‘i and a handful of his colleagues, the Muslim scholars of Damascus
and Aleppo remained relatively passive during the first year of the uprising. One of the
factors explaining this attitude, which is especially relevant in the case of Aleppo, is
the enduring sequels of repression of the early 1980s. In the country’s second largest
city, dozens of ulama were forced into exile at that time, thus further weakening a
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4religious elite that had already suffered from the Baath’s centralist policies, since
there was no institute or faculty for higher Islamic studies in Aleppo before 2006.
Whereas in the biggest cities the men of religion were divided, in the strongholds of
the revolution a large majority of them sided with the protesters. In Deraa, both the
imam of  the Grand Mosque,  Ahmad Sayasne,  and the local  Mufti,  Rizq Abazayd,
officially  announced their  defection.  Sayasne visited President  Bashar al-Assad in
order  to  negotiate  an  end  to  the  crisis,  but  the  continuation  of  state  violence
eventually  convinced him to  call  for  the  overthrow of  the  regime.  Following the
occupation of Deraa by the army in April  2011, both Sayasne and Abazayd were
bullied  into  televised  revocations.  In  Banias,  on  the  coast,  the  very  first
demonstrations were led by Anas Ayrut, a young cleric who eventually fled the city
and  became a  member  of  the  opposition  group,  the  Syrian  National  Council,  in
Istanbul. In Homs, which gradually surfaced as the capital of the revolution, clerics
like Anas Suwayd participated in the creation of  the local  Revolutionary Council.
Although supportive of the armed struggle, they have repeatedly opposed sectarian
killings.8
After August 2011, mosques gradually lost their importance in the uprising for at least
two  reasons:  first,  as  mentioned  above,  in  Damascus  and  Aleppo,  repression
succeeded in making demonstrations increasingly rare in rebellious places of worship;
second, in the regions where the opposition was most powerful (governorates of Homs,
Hama, Idlib, and Reef Damascus), it became increasingly militarised and took control
of several towns and neighbourhoods, thus reducing the importance of mosques as
‘safe’ zones for demonstrations. Only a reinvigoration of the protests in Damascus and
Aleppo or in the regions being re-conquered by Assad’s forces can change radically
the situation.
 
 
 
 
1 .  S e e
www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6Miv8DUvUI&feature=results_video&playnext=1&list=
PLC3AD44DECC3F9267,  July  1,  2011;  www.youtube.com/watch?v=HZ0uF2zAcaA,
July  16,  2011;  www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBQeOh4hsrc,  July  22,  2011;
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OcQ4U4w5DFw,  January  27,  2012.
2. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJiEBm8dvxM.
3 .  F o r  B a s h a r  a l - A s s a d ’ s  d e n i a l :
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AWbUmG-javw&feature=endscreen;  for  the
destruction of a minaret in Deir ez-Zour in August 2011 (view from the armoured
vehicle firing on the mosque):  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFXuHG89TJA; in
Homs, July 2011: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8n7A48II6Us&feature=related
Copyright Near East Quarterly - 4 / 5 - 11.02.2014
54. For background information on the Syrian ulama, see Thomas Pierret, Baas et Islam
en Syrie. La dynastie Assad face aux oulémas (Paris: PUF, 2011).
5.  See  www.youtube.com/watch?v=qDaurYQpBjo,  August  27,  2011.  Pictures  of
al-Rifa‘i  on  his  hospital  bed  were  circulated  on  the  Internet.
6. Thomas Pierret, “Syrie: L’islam dans la revolution,” Politiqueétrangère76 (4) (2011),
888.
7. “Tabyidsura Muhammad Hamshu,” (Whitewashing Muhammad Hamshu’s image),
All4Syria, August 27, 2011, http://all4syria.info/web/archives/25008
8.  Friday  sermon by  Sheikh Mahmud al-Dalati,  November  4,  2011 (mp3);  phone
interview with journalist Nir Rosen after his two months of research in Syria, January
2012.
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